



**Director of
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Intelligence**

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Contents




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
2 USSR-Poland-Romania: *High-Level Meetings* 2

3 West Germany: *Position on INF.* 3

25X1



Top Secret



27 December 1982

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Top Secret

② USSR-POLAND-ROMANIA: High-Level Meetings

1/5 General Secretary Andropov's meetings last week with Polish Premier Jaruzelski and particularly with Romanian President Ceausescu apparently were marked by disagreement. [redacted]

6 The Soviet-Polish communique states that Jaruzelski's session with Andropov took place in a cordial atmosphere but fails to note either an "identity of view" or "mutual understanding"--formulations used to characterize Andropov's earlier meetings with other East European leaders. [redacted]

According to the Soviet-Romanian communique, Andropov's meeting with Ceausescu was "frank and comradely." The two sides exchanged views on bilateral relations, Warsaw Pact and CEMA cooperation, and "topical" foreign policy issues. [redacted]

1/5 Ceausescu, in his speech on the following day, established his own independent position on the CEMA summit and reiterated his controversial proposal for removing all intermediate-range missiles from Europe. The TASS summary of the speech omitted mention of both proposals. [redacted]

6 Comment: The Soviet-Polish communique is cooler than those issued after Jaruzelski's meetings earlier this year with President Brezhnev. This may reflect Andropov's doubts about Jaruzelski's handling of the suspension of martial law or his effectiveness in rebuilding the party. [redacted]

1/5 The characterization of the Soviet-Romanian talks as "frank and comradely" indicates major disagreement. Soviet pressure for Warsaw Pact and CEMA integration has caused friction in the past and probably is becoming more acute as preparations proceed for the meeting of Warsaw Pact party leaders in January and the CEMA summit next summer. The mention of "topical" foreign policy issues almost certainly refers to Ceausescu's INF proposal, which is at odds with Moscow's position. [redacted]

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27 December 1982

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③ WEST GERMANY: Position on INF


3 *The government and the Social Democratic opposition both regard recent Soviet proposals on INF as inadequate, although they view them as a step in the right direction.* [redacted]

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2/3 The West Germans have rejected Moscow's proposal that the West renounce all INF deployments while the USSR retains enough missiles to balance the British and French missiles. They nonetheless consider this proposal to be a sign of progress. [redacted]

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4 Comment: The West Germans probably want the consultative group to endorse the final US negotiating position in Geneva. This would lessen the chances that INF deployments could be criticized on the grounds that the US had not made a reasonable effort to reach an agreement. [redacted]

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4 A spokesman for the Social Democrats has already called on the US to submit a new proposal in Geneva in response to the Soviet proposal. The government also appears to be contemplating positions other than the zero option. [redacted]

25X1

Top Secret

27 December 1982

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Next 7 Page(s) In Document Denied

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25X1

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